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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HOW TEMPLEMIRE V. W & M WELDING, INC. CREATES UNFAIR
JOB SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
On April 15, 2014, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled thirty years of
precedent in a decision that affects every Missouri employer. The decision has
been described as “an easy contender for biggest case of 2014.”1 Imagine the
following scenario: Sally Smith, a waitress at Burger Grill, stole money out of
the cash register after her Tuesday shift. The next week, Sally was injured
when a tray of drinks fell on her hand. Sally subsequently filed a workers’
compensation claim. Sally’s supervisor fired her a few days later after
discovering Sally had stolen money from the cash register. Sally believes she
was fired in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim and brings an
action to recover damages. This scenario illustrates a mixed motive problem,
namely, there is both a lawful and potentially unlawful motive for the
employer’s actions. Should Sally prevail on a claim for workers’ compensation
retaliatory discharge? If so, how strong does the link need to be between the
workers’ compensation claim and the subsequent termination?
In Missouri, section 287.780 of the Missouri Revised Statutes prohibits an
employer from retaliating against an employee for filing a workers’
compensation claim. Section 287.780 provides: “No employer or agent shall
discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any
of his rights under [the Workers’ Compensation Law]. Any employee who has
been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages
against his employer.”2 Before the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision on April
15, 2014, in order to bring a submissible case under section 287.780, an
employee had to show: “(1) [his or her] status as employee of defendant before
injury, (2) [his or her] exercise of a right granted by [the Workers’
Compensation Law], (3) employer’s discharge of or discrimination against
plaintiff, and (4) an exclusive causal relationship between plaintiff’s actions
and defendant’s actions.”3

1. Stephanie Maniscalco, Lowering of Work Comp Standard Biggest Decision so Far, MO.
LAW. WKLY., July 7, 2014, at 1.
2. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000).
3. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984), overruled by
Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (emphasis added).
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Other jurisdictions similarly prohibit employers from retaliating against
employees who file workers’ compensation claims.4 While most jurisdictions
uniformly apply the first three elements, courts differ on the standard of
causation required under the fourth element. “Exclusive cause” is the highest
standard of causation. An employee must show he or she was discharged solely
because of filing a workers’ compensation claim.5 A “motivating or significant
factor” standard of causation is lower than exclusive cause. It requires
employees to show that filing a workers’ compensation claim was a significant
reason for their discharge.6 A “contributing factor” standard is lower than the
motivating or significant factor standard of causation. It requires an employee
to show only a mere correlation between filing a workers’ compensation claim
and subsequent discharge, namely, that filing a workers’ compensation claim
was one of the factors contributing to the employer’s decision to discharge the
employee.7
In Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court
lowered the standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge cases from the well-established exclusive cause8 standard to a much
lower contributing factor standard.9 In other words, employees now only need
to prove that filing a workers’ compensation claim was one of the reasons for
their termination, as opposed to the sole reason for termination.10
Consequently, Missouri employers face increased liability for workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge claims.
This Note argues that the Missouri Supreme Court erred in its decision to
promulgate a lesser standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge cases. This Note also examines the new contributing factor standard
of causation and its effects on Missouri employers. Part I will discuss workers’
compensation generally. Part II will trace the evolution of workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge cases by examining thirty years of
precedent establishing the exclusive cause standard. Part III will examine the

4. See Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Wallace v.
Milliken & Co., 406 S.E.2d 358, 360 (S.C. 1973); Buckner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803,
806 (Okla. 1988); Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 821 P.2d 18, 32 (Wash. 1991).
5. 3 MODERN WORKERS COMP. § 311:12 (1993).
6. Amanda C. Kaiser, Comment, Workers’ Compensation—Anderson v. Standard Register
Co.: Tennessee Supreme Court Specifies Elements Required to Establish a Cause of Action for
Retaliatory Discharge in Workers’ Compensation Cases, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 829
(1994).
7. Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez, 416 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Tex. App. 2013).
8. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275.
9. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014), as modified on
May 27, 2014.
10. Id.
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Templemire decision. Part IV will cover the new contributing factor standard
and will outline concerns associated with the new lesser standard.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Prior to the enactment of workers’ compensation laws, recovery for
employees who were injured on the job was restricted under the common law
theory of negligence.11 Employees were burdened with overcoming three
common law defenses used by employers:12 assumption of risk,13 contributory
negligence,14 and the fellow-servant doctrine.15 The negligence avenue of
recovery often left employees with no redress.16 Prior to the enactment of
workers’ compensation laws, it was estimated that between seventy and ninetyfour percent of injured workers who filed a claim against their employer
received no compensation for their injuries.17
Various state legislatures responded in the early 1900s by enacting
workers’ compensation legislation to afford a more effective remedy for
employees injured on the job.18 By 1920, all but eight states had established
workers’ compensation acts to provide benefits for injured employees.19
Missouri joined the national movement in 1925.20 The Missouri Workers’
Compensation Law was enacted to wholly substitute common law remedies for
injured employees.21 This statute struck a balance between employers and
employees; the employer accepted absolute liability, and, in return, the
11. Amanda Yoder, Note, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bringing Common Law
Negligence Back Into Employment Law, 75 MO. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2010).
12. Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
13. H. S. J., Torts—Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 11 TEX. L. REV. 565, 566 (1933) (“The
doctrine of assumption of risk, originating in Priestley v. Fowler is generally treated as the
voluntary acquiescence by the plaintiff in a risk which either was known or should have been
known to him at the time of his injury.”) (citation omitted).
14. Jennifer J. Karangelen, Comment, The Road to Judicial Abolishment of Contributory
Negligence Has Been Paved by Bozman v. Bozman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 265, 267 (2004)
(defining “contributory negligence” as “conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the
standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing
cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm”).
15. Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 1837–1860,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1984) (“The Fellow Servant rule was a rule of tort law created in
the mid-nineteenth century. It carved out an exception to the well-established rule of respondeat
superior, and relieved employers of liability for injuries negligently inflicted by any employee
upon a ‘fellow servant.’”).
16. Yoder, supra note 11, at 1098.
17. Gunnett, 70 S.W.3d at 635.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 365 n.2 (explaining that Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law was adopted in
1925 and became effective in 1927).
21. Leicht v. Venture Stores, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
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employee forewent his right to pursue a negligence claim against his
employer.22 Employees gave up a potentially higher payout, but employees
received speedy and guaranteed compensation for work-related injuries.23 By
1974, the Missouri workers’ compensation legislation became “compulsory for
all employers with more than five employees.”24 In addition to a system of
recovery for employees injured on the job, the Missouri Workers’
Compensation statute protects employees from retaliatory discharge by
employers.
II. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RETALIATORY DISCHARGE: THIRTY YEARS OF
PRECEDENT
Missouri adheres to the “at-will” employment doctrine, which allows an
employer to discharge an at-will employee for any reason or for no reason.25
An at-will employee has no cause of action for wrongful discharge, absent a
statutory or public policy exception.26 Section 287.780 provides a limited
statutory exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
Section 287.780 prohibits employers from retaliating against employees
who file a workers’ compensation claim. The statute provides: “No employer
or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for
exercising any of his rights under [the Workers’ Compensation Law]. Any
employee who has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil
action for damages against his employer.”27 This anti-retaliation provision
created a statutory private right of action for retaliatory discharge. The
elements for a section 287.780 cause of action were set forth by the Missouri
Supreme Court in 1984.
A.

Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co. (1984)

The Missouri Supreme Court established elements for a section 287.780
cause of action for the first time in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.28
In Hansome, an employee exercised his workers’ compensation rights after
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Yoder, supra note 11, at 1099–1100.
25. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010).
26. Id. (“[The Missouri Supreme Court] expressly adopt[ed] the following as the publicpolicy exception to the at-will employment doctrine: An at-will employee may not be terminated
(1) for refusing to violate the law or any well-established and clear mandate of public policy as
expressed in the constitution, statutes, regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules
created by a governmental body or (2) for reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors
or public authorities.”) (citations omitted).
27. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000).
28. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984), overruled by
Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014).
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suffering from a work-related injury.29 The employee was subsequently
discharged approximately a month later because “[he] got hurt on the job[,]
drew [his] Workmen’s Compensation, and went back and forth to the doctor’s
office.”30 The employee brought an action against his employer pursuant to
section 287.780.31 A jury returned a verdict for the employee.32 The Missouri
Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed.33 The Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision.34
The court set forth elements to make a submissible case under section
287.780 for the first time. The plaintiff employee had to show: “(1) plaintiff’s
status as employee of defendant before injury, (2) plaintiff’s exercise of a right
granted by [the Workers’ Compensation Law], (3) employer’s discharge of or
discrimination against plaintiff, and (4) an exclusive causal relationship
between plaintiff’s actions and defendant’s actions.”35 The first three elements
had been met.36 The crux of the case turned on whether a causal relationship
existed between filing the workers’ compensation claim and the employee’s
subsequent discharge.37
The court cited Davis v. Richmond Special Road District38 and Mitchell v.
St. Louis County39 as support for the exclusive cause standard of causation,
explaining that “[c]ausality does not exist if the basis for discharge is valid and
nonpretextual.”40 The court applied the exclusive cause standard and found the
employee made a submissible case under section 287.780 because he was fired
for exercising his workers’ compensation rights.41

29. Id. at 274.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 275.
32. Id. at 274.
33. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 274.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(“[Section 287.780] reveals a legislative intent that there must be a causal relationship between
the exercise of the right by the employee and his discharge by his employer arising precisely from
the employee’s exercise of his rights, and upon proof, that the discharge was related to the
employee’s exercise of his or her rights.”) (emphasis added).
39. Mitchell v. St. Louis Cty., 575 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (“[I]t is palpable
that a [section 287.780] cause of action lies only if an employee is discharged discriminatorily by
reason of exercising his or her rights under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.”) (emphasis
added).
40. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275 n.2.
41. Id. at 276.
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Crabtree v. Bugby (1998)

The exclusive cause standard set forth in Hansome was reaffirmed fourteen
years later by the Missouri Supreme Court in Crabtree v. Bugby.42 In Crabtree,
an employee brought a retaliatory discharge claim against her employer,
pursuant to section 287.780, alleging she was discharged for filing a workers’
compensation claim.43 The jury returned a verdict for the employee.44 The
employer appealed and the court of appeals transferred the case to the Missouri
Supreme Court.45 Judgment was reversed because the trial court had applied a
“direct result” standard, rather than the exclusive cause standard set forth in
Hansome.46
On appeal, the employer challenged the employee’s verdict director who
instructed the jury to return a verdict for employee if, “as a direct result of
plaintiff’s filing a claim for compensation, defendant discharged plaintiff.”47
The court found employee’s verdict director had not accurately stated the law
because claims brought pursuant to section 278.780 required an “exclusive
causal relationship between the plaintiff’s cause of action and the discharge.”48
“Direct result” language, the court reasoned, permitted the jury to return a
verdict for the employee even though there were multiple reasons for her
termination.49 The exclusive cause standard, in contrast, required an employee
to prove that filing a workers’ compensation claim was the only reason for
termination.50 The court refused to disturb its own precedent, absent “a
recurring injustice or absurd results,” reasoning that “neither the trial court nor
the court of appeals is free to redefine the elements in every case that comes
before them.”51 Those who disagree, the court concluded, “[we]re free to seek
redress in the legislative arena.”52
The exclusive cause standard, articulated in Hansome and affirmed in
Crabtree, was continuously reaffirmed53 until the Missouri Supreme Court
42. Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. 1998), overruled by Templemire v. W & M
Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014).
43. Id. at 69.
44. Id. at 70.
45. Id. at 68.
46. Id. at 68, 71.
47. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71 (emphasis added).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 71–72 (citation omitted).
52. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72.
53. See Stephenson v. Raskas Dairy, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(“Respondent failed to make a submissible case of discriminatory discharge, in that she did not
prove that the exclusive cause of her discharge was the exercise of her workers’ compensation
rights.”); Blair v. Steadley Co., 740 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“[T]here is no doubt
but that the declaration of the exclusive causal relationship test in Hansome was a declaration of
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overruled its own precedent on April 15, 2014. In Templemire v. W & M
Welding, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court lowered the causation standard for
workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims from exclusive cause to
contributing factor.
III. TEMPLEMIRE V. W & M WELDING, INC.
A.

Facts

John Templemire (“Templemire”) was hired by W & M Welding, Inc. as a
painter and general laborer.54 While performing his usual duties, Templemire’s
left foot was crushed by a large metal beam that fell from a forklift.55
Templemire subsequently filed a workers’ compensation claim.56 After only a
few weeks, Templemire returned to work, but his physician ordered certain
physical restrictions.57 For instance, Templemire was not able to climb stairs,
push, pull, or stand for longer than one hour without a fifteen-minute break.58
On the morning of November 29, 2006, Templemire was ordered to wash and
paint a railing.59 Templemire performed other tasks while he waited for the
railing to be prepared for washing.60 Later in the afternoon, before washing and
painting the railing, Templemire took a break to rest his foot.61 Gary McMullin
(“McMullin”), the owner of W & M Welding, Inc., was infuriated when he
found Templemire taking a break and the unwashed railing.62 McMullin
immediately fired Templemire.63
B.

Procedural Posture

Templemire subsequently filed suit against W & M Welding, Inc.,
pursuant to section 287.780, alleging workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge.64 During the jury instruction conference, Templemire argued that

substantive law.”); Wiedower v. ACF Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(“The exclusive cause for the employee’s discharge must be the exercise of a right under the
Workers’ Compensation Law.”) (citing Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275
(Mo. 1984)).
54. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Mo. 2014), as modified on
May 27, 2014.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 374.
59. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 374.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 374.
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the applicable Missouri Approved Instruction (MAI) verdict director misstated
Missouri law because its “exclusive cause” language was contrary to the plain
language of section 287.780.65 Templemire tendered a modified instruction
substituting “contributing factor” for the “exclusive cause” language.66 The
circuit court nevertheless instructed the jury on the “exclusive cause” standard
of causation, and the jury returned a verdict for W & M Welding, Inc.67
On appeal, Templemire alleged that the circuit court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury to use the contributing factor standard.68 In support of his
assertion, Templemire argued that the exclusive cause standard is contrary to
the statutory language of section 287.780, and also the causation standard
applied in both Missouri Human Rights Act and public policy wrongful
termination cases.69
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded.70 Specifically, the
Missouri Supreme Court found the exclusive causation standard was
unsupported by both case law and the plain language of section 287.780.71 The
court declined to adhere to precedent, overruling the two seminal cases
establishing the exclusive cause standard for workers’ compensation retaliation
claims.72 Further, the court held that a contributing factor standard of causation
is proper for section 287.780 claims.73 The Missouri Supreme Court found the
circuit court erred when it instructed the jury using “exclusive cause”
language, and the error resulted in prejudice that materially affected the case.74
As a result, Templemire was entitled to a new trial where the jury is instructed
using the contributing factor standard.75
C. Majority Opinion
1.

Historic Construction of Section 287.780

Judge Draper, writing for the majority, began his analysis by examining
the historic construction of section 287.780. Section 287.780 was enacted as

65. Id. at 375; “No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any
employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been
discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his employer.”
MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000).
66. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 375.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 376.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 386.
71. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 382.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 384.
74. Id. at 385.
75. Id.
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part of the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law and provided a statutory
exception to the at-will employment doctrine.76 Specifically, it provided a
private right of action for employees who were “discharged or discriminated
against” for filing a workers’ compensation claim.77 Section 287.780 was
enacted as part of the original workers’ compensation law in 1925 and
amended in 1973 with the language that remains today.78
The court next surveyed Missouri cases construing section 287.780,
beginning with Mitchell v. St. Louis County.79 Mitchell had been the first case
to address section 287.780.80 An employee had alleged her discharge was
discriminatory because it had occurred only months after she had filed a
workers’ compensation claim.81 The record amply supported that she had been
discharged for excessive absenteeism.82 Causality did not exist, the court had
concluded, because the basis for the discharge had not been pretextual.83 The
court in Templemire noted that Mitchell did not explicitly discuss the proper
causation standard to apply, but it generally recognized a need for a causal
connection between a workers’ compensation claim and subsequent
discharge.84
The court then examined Davis v. Richmond Special Road District.85 The
Davis court had stated, “[Section 287.780] reveals a legislative intent that there
must be a causal relationship between the exercise of the right by the employee
and his discharge by his employer . . . .”86 The mere discharge of an employee,
the Davis court stated, was not enough.87 Rather, an employee was burdened
with demonstrating that he had been discriminated against “simply because of
the exercise of his or her rights regarding a workers’ compensation claim.”88
The court in Templemire noted that although Davis recognized causation as an

76. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 376; see Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d
342, 345–46 (Mo. 2010) (“The at-will employment doctrine is well-established Missouri law.
Absent an employment contract with a ‘definite statement of duration . . . an employment at will
is created.’ An employer may terminate an at-will employee ‘for any reason or for no reason.’
The at-will doctrine is ‘[r]ooted in freedom of contract and private property principles, designed
to yield efficiencies across a broad range of industries.’”) (citations omitted).
77. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377.
78. Id.
79. See Mitchell v. St. Louis Cty., 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
80. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 379.
85. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377; see also Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649
S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
86. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377 (emphasis omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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element of a workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claim, it had not
suggested a heightened exclusive cause standard.89
In 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court, for the first time, articulated the
exclusive cause standard of causation for claims brought pursuant to section
287.780 in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.90 In Hansome, the
Missouri Supreme Court set forth four elements a plaintiff had to demonstrate
pursuant to a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 287.780.91 To satisfy
the final element, plaintiff had to demonstrate “an exclusive causal relationship
between [employee’s] actions and [employer’s] actions.”92 The court in
Templemire expressed concern that the Hansome test had been based on
Mitchell v. St. Louis County and Davis v. Richmond Special Road District
rather than an analysis or interpretation of the statutory language of section
287.780.93 The Templemire court found that Hansome’s reliance on Mitchell
and Davis for the exclusive cause standard had been unfounded because
neither contained any reference to a heightened or exclusive cause standard of
causation.94
The court next considered its decision in Crabtree v. Bugby,95 which had
reaffirmed Hansome’s exclusive cause standard.96 The court in Crabtree had
reasoned that “this Court should not lightly disturb its own precedent . . . in the
absence of a recurring injustice or absurd results.”97 The court in Templemire
did not find the majority’s reasoning in Crabtree compelling. Rather, the
Templemire court aligned with the dissenting opinion in Crabtree, which had
challenged the “exclusive cause” standard articulated by Hansome.98 The
dissent in Crabtree had based its contention on a textual analysis of section
287.780 that revealed an absence of the word “exclusive,” as used in the
Hansome test, as well as any other language that suggested an employee may
only recover if he has been discharged exclusively because he had filed a
workers’ compensation claim.99 Furthermore, the dissent had noted that neither
Mitchell nor Davis, the authority by which the Hansome test was based, had
used the word “exclusive” in reference to the causation standard under section

89. Id. at 379.
90. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984), overruled by
Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014).
91. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377–78.
92. Id. at 378.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 379.
95. See Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 71 (Mo. 1998), overruled by Templemire v. W &
M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014).
96. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378 (citation omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 379.
99. Id. at 378.
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287.780.100 Consequently, the dissent in Crabtree rejected the Hansome test,
and it characterized the “exclusive cause” language as “‘an aberration’ . . .
[which] ‘appears to be plucked out of thin air.’”101
The court continued its discussion with Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute,
P.C., the first case to question the exclusive cause standard since it was first
articulated in Hansome.102 Fleshner involved a retaliatory discharge claim
based on the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.103
The court for the first time had recognized a public policy exception to the atwill employment doctrine, and thus had to determine the proper causation
standard to apply.104 The employer had offered a jury instruction with the
“exclusive cause” language, borrowed from the causation standard for
statutory retaliatory discharge as set forth in Hansome.105 The court criticized
the exclusive cause standard of causation because “[n]owhere in the workers’
compensation laws does ‘exclusive causal’ or ‘exclusive causation’ language
appear.”106 Additionally, the court had warned that application of the exclusive
cause standard would provide a disincentive for employees to report their
employers’ violations of the law.107
The court in Templemire found the exclusive cause standard was
unfounded because neither Mitchell nor Davis, the authority by which the
exclusive cause standard was articulated, contained any reference to a
heightened exclusive cause standard. 108 The court held that stare decisis
should not be applied because Hansome and Crabtree were clearly
erroneous.109 After finding no case law to support the exclusive cause standard,
the court next looked for statutory support.
2.

Plain Language of Section 287.780

The court analyzed the plain language of section 287.780, which “prohibits
an employer from discharging or in any way discriminating against an

100. Id.
101. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378 (citation omitted).
102. See Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010).
103. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378–79.
104. Id. at 379; see also Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 90 (“The issue before this Court is how the
jury should be instructed as to the appropriate causation standard when an at-will employee is
discharged in violation of the public-policy exception.”).
105. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 379.
109. Id. (The court articulated the standard for adhering to precedent: “adherence to precedent
is not absolute . . . . [W]here it appears that an opinion is clearly erroneous and manifestly wrong,
the rule [of] stare decisis is never applied to prevent the repudiation of such decision”) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted).
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employee for exercising his or her workers’ compensation rights.”110 This
language, the Templemire court reasoned, dictated a clear legislative intent to
prohibit an employer from giving any consideration to an employee’s workers’
compensation claim.111 Requiring an employee to show his or her discharge
was based solely or exclusively on the fact that he or she filed a workers’
compensation claim, the court warned, would allow for some discrimination,
which runs afoul of legislative intent.112 Furthermore, a textual analysis of the
statutory language exposed an absence of the words “exclusively,” “solely,”
and “only,” any of which would support a heightened or exclusive cause
standard.113 Accordingly, the court found no statutory support for the exclusive
cause standard promulgated in Hansome.114
After concluding that the exclusive cause standard had no support in either
case law or statutory interpretation, the Templemire court sought to determine
the appropriate causation standard for retaliatory discharge claims brought
pursuant to section 287.780.115
3.

Appropriate Causation Standard

Templemire urged the court to adopt a “contributing factor” standard,
which would allow an employee to recover if the employee’s workers’
compensation claim was one of the reasons for termination.116 The employer,
on the other hand, urged the court to adhere to a “heightened” or “motivating
factor” test.117 In order to determine the proper causation standard for workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge claims, the court looked to case law
interpreting other forms of employment discrimination and the statutory
language of section 287.780.118
In 2007, the court had held, in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights,119
that an employee must show his status under the Missouri Human Rights Act
(MHRA)120 was a contributing factor to his discharge.121 The contributing
110. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 381.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 382.
113. Id. at 381.
114. Id. at 382.
115. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 382.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 383–84.
119. See Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. 2007).
120. The Missouri Human Rights Act prohibits an employer from considering age, disability,
or other protected characteristics when making an employment decision. MO. REV. STAT. §
213.055 (2014). The MHRA retaliation provision provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [t]o retaliate or discriminate in any
manner against any other person because such person has opposed any practice prohibited
by this chapter or because such person has filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
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factor standard for MHRA retaliation claims was reaffirmed two years later in
Hill v. Ford Motor Co.122 Further, in 2010, the court held in Fleshner that the
appropriate standard of causation for wrongful discharge claims brought under
the public policy exception123 to the at-will employment doctrine was
contributing factor.124 The Templemire court stated that a contributing factor
standard of causation would accordingly “align[] workers’ compensation
discrimination with other Missouri employment discrimination laws,” such as
the MHRA and the public policy exception to Missouri’s at-will employment
doctrine.125 The court, however, recognized a fundamental difference between
the purpose of workers’ compensation laws and the purpose of the MHRA.126
Nevertheless, the court found commonality in the broad purpose of all
employment discrimination laws.127 The court reasoned as follows:
[T]here can be no tolerance for employment discrimination in the
workplace . . . . Discrimination against an employee for exercising his or her
rights under the workers’ compensation law is just as illegal, insidious, and
reprehensible as discrimination under the [Missouri Human Rights Act] or for
retaliatory discharge under the public policy exception of the at-will
128
employment doctrine.

The court also considered the statutory language of section 287.780 to
determine the proper standard of causation. Section 287.780 prohibits an
employer from discriminating against an employee “in any way” for exercising
his or her rights under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law.129 The court
found the phrase “in any way” to be consistent with a “contributing factor”
standard rather than an “exclusive cause” standard.130 Thus, the court
maintained, a contributing factor standard “fulfills the purpose of the statute,

participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant
to this chapter.
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.070(2) (2014).
121. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 383.
122. Id. at 383; see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo. 2009).
123. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010) (“[T]his Court
expressly adopts the following as the public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine:
An at-will employee may not be terminated (1) for refusing to violate the law or any wellestablished and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in the constitution, statutes,
regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules created by a governmental body or (2) for
reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors or public authorities.”) (citations omitted).
124. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2014).
130. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
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which is to prohibit employers from discharging or in any way discriminating
against an employee for exercising his or her rights under chapter 287.”131
After analyzing case law interpreting other forms of employment
discrimination and the statutory language of section 287.780, the court held the
appropriate standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge claims is contributing factor.132 This means an employee is entitled
to relief where filing a workers’ compensation claim was a contributing factor
in his or her discharge.133 In doing so, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned
thirty years of precedent.
D. Dissent
Judge Fischer and Judge Wilson dissented from the majority’s overruling
of Hansome and Crabtree.134 The dissent’s main concern stemmed from the
majority’s failure to adhere to stare decisis.135 The dissent noted that the court
was not tasked with a matter of first impression.136 The court should have been
bound by precedent, especially “when that precedent concerns settled
questions of statutory interpretation,” as it did in this case.137 Absent a more
compelling need, the dissent contended, passage of time and a change in court
membership is not enough to overturn precedent.138 Further, hindsight as to
whether the exclusive cause standard was correct does not change the fact that
the court had construed section 287.780 in Hansome, and thus the court should
have been bound by it.139
The dissent further argued that the failure of the legislature to enact
legislation on this subject matter, namely, the standard of causation in workers’
compensation retaliation cases, acted as ratification of the court’s statutory
interpretation.140 The Missouri Legislature overhauled the workers’
compensation law in 2005, while specifically leaving the judicial
interpretations in Hansome and Crabtree undisturbed.141 The dissent
emphasized that such legislative action demonstrated an “intent to retain the
exclusive cause standard for workers’ compensation retaliation claims.”142 The
majority’s opinion thus offended the legislature’s ratification of the exclusive

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 389.
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 390.
Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 390.
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cause standard of causation.143 The dissent warned that “[e]ven if the
‘contributing factor’ standard is the better rule, this Court should not usurp the
legislative function by re-deciding settled questions of statutory construction
due solely to a change of heart.”144
The new contributing factor standard of causation for workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge is controversial. The new standard will
have far-reaching effects on all Missouri employers. Accordingly, the next
section of this Note discusses concerns associated with the new lesser standard
of causation.
IV. NEW STANDARD: THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT GOT IT WRONG
In a 5–2 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court abandoned the exclusive
cause standard of causation, overruling its own precedent, which had explicitly
established the standard of causation for workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge claims. In doing so, the court has burdened employers. It is now
easier for employees to bring frivolous workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge claims, creating heightened job security. Accordingly, the circuit
court’s decision, which relied on the exclusive cause standard, should have
been affirmed145 for six reasons: (A) the contributing factor standard fails to
align workers’ compensation retaliation claims with MHRA claims, (B) the
exclusive cause standard has remained unchanged for thirty years, (C) the
exclusive cause standard is consistent with the legislature’s intent, (D)
precedent in other states supports a heightened standard of causation, (E) a
heightened standard of causation would align Missouri with federal
discrimination laws, and (F) the new contributing factor standard has farreaching, adverse implications on Missouri employers.
A.

The contributing factor standard fails to align workers’ compensation
retaliation claims with MHRA claims

The court in Templemire established that a submissible case for workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge requires an employee to show that filing a
workers’ compensation claim is only a contributing factor to the employee’s
discharge.146 The new contributing factor standard fails to align section
287.780 cases with MHRA retaliation cases as the majority in Templemire

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. I will also alternatively argue that the court should have applied at least a significant or
motivating factor standard, which is higher than contributing factor but lower than exclusive
cause. See infra Part IV(D).
146. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
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intended.147 A comparison of the new jury instruction for workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge cases and the jury instruction for MHRA
retaliation cases indicates that the standard for section 287.780 cases is even
more burdensome on employers than for MHRA cases. The contributing factor
standard is now reflected in Missouri Approved Instruction (MAI) 38.04, the
jury instruction used in retaliatory discharge cases brought under section
287.780. MAI 38.04 became effective on January 1, 2015 and provides the
elements of a section 287.780 cause of action:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, plaintiff was employed by defendant, and
Second, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim, and
Third, defendant discharged plaintiff, and
Fourth, plaintiff’s filing of the workers’ compensation claim was a
contributing factor to plaintiff’s discharge, and
148

Fifth, as a direct result of such discharge plaintiff sustained damage.

The MHRA instruction, MAI 38.01(A), includes similar language;149
however, MAI 38.01(A) also includes affirmative defense language: “unless
you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction Number
___ (here insert number of affirmative defense instruction).”150 The newly
revised MAI 38.04 does not include affirmative defense language. In addition
to the affirmative defense option, employers subject to a MHRA retaliation
claim may also use a “lawful justification” jury instruction. MAI 38.02 directs
the jury to find for the employer if there was a lawful reason for the alleged
discriminatory act and the protected classification was not a contributing
factor.151 There is no “lawful justification” jury instruction for employers
subject to a claim under section 287.780. Consequently, the new “contributing
factor” standard fails to align workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge
cases with MHRA cases. In order to truly align these causes of action, the
147. Id. at 382, 384 (“[The standard] now aligns workers’ compensation discrimination with
other Missouri employment discrimination laws.”).
148. MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CIVIL) 38.04 (7th ed.) (emphasis added).
149. MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CIVIL) 38.01(A) (7th ed.) (“Your verdict must be for
plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant (here insert the alleged discriminatory act, such as
“failed to hire,” “discharged” or other act within the scope of § 213.055, RSMo) plaintiff, and
Second, (here insert one or more of the protected classifications supported by the evidence such
as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability) was a contributing factor
in such (here, repeat alleged discriminatory act, such as “failure to hire,” “discharge,” etc.), and
Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damage. * [unless you believe
plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction Number ______ (here insert number of
affirmative defense instruction)].”).
150. Id.
151. MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CIVIL) 38.02 (7th ed.).
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legislature should provide employers who are subject to a workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge claim with affirmative defenses and a
lawful justification option. Otherwise, workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge cases are actually more burdensome on employers than MHRA
cases.
B.

The exclusive cause standard has remained unchanged for thirty years
and should remain unchanged

The majority’s failure to adhere to well-established precedent threatens the
fabric of our legal system.152 “What makes this country’s legal system the envy
of the modern democratic world, and what sets it apart from most others, is the
reliability of the outcome of cases based on the doctrine of stare decisis.”153
Missouri case law provided clear precedent on the standard of causation to
apply in workers’ compensation retaliation cases. The Missouri Supreme Court
articulated a standard for section 287.780 cases and has reaffirmed that
standard.154
Judicial abandonment of the exclusive cause standard requires an injustice
or absurdity.155 “[A] decision of this Court should not be lightly overruled,
particularly where the opinion has remained unchanged for many years and is
not clearly erroneous and manifestly wrong.”156 The court in Crabtree
explained that “[m]ere disagreement by the current Court with the statutory
analysis of a predecessor Court is not a satisfactory basis for violating the
doctrine of stare decisis . . . in the absence of a recurring injustice or absurd
results.”157 Adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis ensures stability and
predictability in the law.158 The majority in Templemire failed to convey any
injustice or absurdity to overcome the steadfast deference to stare decisis.
In Crabtree, the Missouri Supreme Court actually warned of the absurd
results that would occur if the exclusive cause standard for a section 287.780
cause of action was abandoned.159 The court cautioned that a lesser standard of
causation “would encourage marginally competent employees to file the most

152. See Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 377–78. The “exclusive cause” standard of causation for section 287.780 workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge cases was first articulated in Hansome and reaffirmed in
Crabtree. Id.
155. Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Mo. 1998), overruled by Templemire v. W & M
Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014).
156. Eighty Hundred Clayton Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 111 S.W.3d 409, 411 n.3 (Mo. 2003)
(citation omitted).
157. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72.
158. Ronnoco Coffee Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 185 S.W.3d 676, 681 n.11 (Mo. 2006).
159. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72.
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petty claims in order to enjoy the benefits of heightened job security.”160
Employees who were fired for legitimate reasons, such as absenteeism or
incompetence, would still be able to bring a retaliation claim against their
employers if they had recently filed a workers’ compensation claim.161
Employers may, as a result, hesitate to fire otherwise incompetent employees
in order to avoid the increased costs of a potential retaliation claim.
Abandoning the exclusive cause standard in favor of a lower contributing
factor standard would thus result in heightened job security, a far cry from the
purpose of workers’ compensation.162 As a result, work quality will likely
decline and employers may hesitate to expand their workforce.
The precedent for a section 287.780 cause of action had been well
established and should have been followed. Mere disagreement with the
statutory analysis of a predecessor court is not enough.163 If the exclusive cause
standard was problematic, redress was available in the legislative arena.164
C. The exclusive cause standard is consistent with the legislature’s intent
The actions, or in this case inactions, of the Missouri Legislature support
the exclusive cause standard of causation for retaliatory discharge actions
brought against an employer. Despite thirty years of opportunity, the Missouri
Legislature did not change the exclusive cause standard first articulated by the
court in Hansome.165 While legislative inaction might sometimes be
ambiguous, in this case it is not. The legislature ratifies a judicial interpretation
by enacting legislation on the same subject matter without changing the
judicial interpretation.166 In 2005, the Missouri Legislature revised the
Workers’ Compensation Law, leaving the cause of action under section
287.780 unaltered.167 The legislature’s failure to revise section 287.780 after
judicial interpretation can be construed as adoption of the exclusive cause
standard developed by courts.168
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (“The purpose of the workers’ compensation law, including the rule of liberal
construction, is to compensate workers for job-related injuries; it is not to insure job security.”).
163. Id. at 71–72.
164. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72.
165. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984).
166. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 388 (Mo. 2014) (Fischer, J.,
dissenting).
167. Changes in Missouri Workers Compensation Law, HEALTHLINK (Aug. 2005),
http://www.healthlink.com/documents/mo_compensation_law.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FB8-YC2S]
(listing specific changes in Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law and failing to indicate any
changes to section 287.780).
168. Dow Chem. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 834 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo. 1992) (“The construction
of a statute by a court of last resort becomes a part of the statute ‘as if it had been so amended by
the legislature.’”) (citation omitted).
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The Missouri Legislature has, in the past, specifically rejected judicial
interpretations of Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law. For instance, in
section 287.043, the legislature specifically rejected and abrogated earlier case
law interpreting the meaning of “owner.”169 This illustrates that the Missouri
Legislature has rejected a judicial interpretation that ran afoul of the
legislature’s intent. Conversely, the Missouri Legislature allowed the
“exclusive cause” interpretation of section 287.780 to stand while it made
specific revisions on the same subject matter,170 constituting ratification by
Missouri’s Legislature of the “exclusive cause” standard. The dissent in
Templemire warned that “[t]o overrule a legislative ratification of this Court’s
prior statutory interpretations is to encroach on the function of the
legislature.”171 Therefore, legislative intent supports an exclusive cause
standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases.
D. Precedent in other states supports a heightened standard of causation
In addition to thirty years of precedent in Missouri, well-established laws
in other states shed light on the need for a standard of causation higher than
contributing factor. The court in Templemire held that the text of section
287.780 demanded a low standard of causation, namely, the contributing factor
standard, because of the phrase “in any way,” and an absence of the words
“exclusively,” “solely,” or “only.”172 However, similar statutory causes of
action for retaliatory discharge in other states, which use or omit similar
language, require a higher standard of causation. Other state statutes, like
section 287.780, do not explicitly require a heightened standard in the statutory
language, but they have nevertheless been interpreted by courts to require a
higher standard. For instance, in Washington, section 51.48.025 of the Revised
Code of Washington provides:
No employer may discharge or in any manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed or communicated to the employer
an intent to file a claim for compensation or exercises any rights provided
under this title. However, nothing in this section prevents an employer from
taking any action against a worker for other reasons including, but not limited

169. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.043 (2015) (“In applying the provisions of subsection 1 of section
287.020 and subsection 4 of section 287.040, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and
abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of ‘owner’, as extended
in the following cases: Owner Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n., Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 133
S.W.3d 162 (Mo. App. S.D., 2004); Nunn v. C.C. Midwest, 151 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. App. W.D.,
2004).”) (emphasis added).
170. Changes in Missouri Workers Compensation Law, supra note 167.
171. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 388 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 381.
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to, the worker’s failure to observe health or safety standards adopted by the
173
employer, or the frequency or nature of the worker’s job-related accidents.

Although the statutory text does not provide language such as “exclusively,”
“solely,” or “only,” Washington courts have interpreted the statutory text as
requiring a heightened standard of causation.174 For example, the court in
Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. applied a substantial factor
standard of causation, which required the employee to prove that filing a
workers’ compensation claim was a “substantial” or “significant” factor in the
employer’s decision to discharge the employee.175 Additionally, section
51.48.025 uses the phrase “in any manner,” much like the phrase “in any way,”
used in section 287.780. Unlike the Templemire court, Washington courts
construe this language as requiring a heightened standard of causation, namely,
a substantial factor standard.176 While this is not as strict as the exclusive cause
standard, it is a higher standard than the contributing factor standard because
an employee must show more than a mere correlation between filing a
workers’ compensation claim and subsequent discharge.
Similarly, Oregon courts have required a heightened standard of causation
for workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims, despite a lack of
explicit statutory language, such as “exclusively,” “solely,” or “only.” Section
659A.040 of the Oregon Revised Statutes provides:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
a worker with respect to hire or tenure or any term or condition of employment
because the worker has applied for benefits or invoked or utilized the
procedures provided for in [the Workers’ Compensation Law] or has given
177
testimony under the provisions of those laws.

The court in Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. interpreted section 659A.040 to
require a heightened standard of causation, namely, substantial factor or “a
factor that made a difference.”178
Interpretations of similar statutory causes of action indicate that the court
in Templemire should have, at the very least, adopted a significant factor
standard of causation. This standard of causation is higher than a contributing
factor standard but lower than exclusive cause, and it would require employees
to show that filing a workers’ compensation claim was a “substantial factor” in

173. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.48.025 (2015) (emphasis added).
174. Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 821 P.2d 18, 30 (Wash. 1991).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.040 (2013).
178. Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civil No. 08-410-ST, 2009 WL 3462056, at *7 (D. Or.
Oct. 21, 2009).
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their termination.179 A heightened standard of causation would align Missouri
with other states as well as the federal government.
E.

A heightened standard of causation would align Missouri with the federal
government

A lower standard of causation means Missouri is departing even further
from federal anti-discrimination statutes. Since 2007, there has been a general
trend toward lowering the burden of proof necessary for a Missouri employee
to recover in employment discrimination cases. This trend began in Daugherty
v. City of Maryland Heights, where the court lessened the burden of proof for
MHRA discrimination cases from “motivating factor” to “contributing
factor.”180 The Templemire decision continued the trajectory by lowering the
standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases
from “exclusive cause” to “contributing factor.”181 As a result, the contributory
factor standard of causation widens the gap between Missouri and federal
discrimination laws.
A gap exists between the causation standard for MHRA retaliation cases
and its federal counterpart. The MHRA prohibits an employer from
discriminating “because of the race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
ancestry, age or disability of any individual[.]”182 The retaliation provision of
the MHRA provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [t]o retaliate or discriminate
in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed any
practice prohibited by this chapter or because such person has filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any
183
investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant to this chapter[.]

Missouri courts apply a “contributing factor” standard of causation for
retaliation cases brought under the MHRA.184 Thus, an employee must show
that “color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disability”185 was a
contributing factor in the employer’s alleged discriminatory act.186
On the federal level, a higher standard of causation is required in
retaliation cases. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was

179. Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 30.
180. Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819–20 (Mo. 2007).
181. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014).
182. MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.055 (West 2012).
183. Id. § 213.070.
184. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 820.
185. MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.055.
186. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 820; see also MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (Civil) 38.01(A)
(7th ed.); MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (Civil) 38.01(B) (7th ed.).
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enacted in 1967 to protect employees from arbitrary age requirements.187
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee “because of such individual’s age.”188 The ADEA retaliation
provision provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made
unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under
189
this chapter.

An employee bringing a disparate-treatment claim under the ADEA must show
that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s alleged age
discrimination.190 “The parameters of this but-for standard are unclear, with
some suggesting it will require proof of sole causation.”191 Therefore, a “butfor” causation standard can be construed as a heightened standard, more akin
to the exclusive cause standard than a contributing factor standard of causation.
On the federal level, under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to
discriminate “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”192 Title VII’s retaliation provision provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees . . . to discriminate against any individual . . .
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
193
this subchapter.

Federal courts apply traditional “but-for” causation for retaliation cases
brought under Title VII.194 Thus, an employee must show “the unlawful
retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful
action or actions of the employer.”195
The exclusive cause standard of causation would thereby align Missouri
discrimination laws more closely with federal protections. In doing so, the

187. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 167 (2009).
188. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (West 2006).
189. Id. § 623(d).
190. Gross, 557 U.S. at 177.
191. Cheryl L. Anderson, Unification of Standards in Discrimination Law: The Conundrum
of Causation and Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, 82 MISS. L.J. 67, 69 (2013).
192. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2006).
193. Id. § 2000e-3.
194. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
195. Id.
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court would help make Missouri more “economically competitive.”196 For
instance, businesses would no longer have to keep track of different federal
and state standards, increasing certainty as to what the laws are. Furthermore, a
higher standard of causation would decrease the number of frivolous suits,
freeing up resources for employers to expand their businesses.
A higher causation standard would also protect Missouri’s small
businesses. “Small businesses are crucial to the fiscal condition of the state,”
representing 97.6% of all employers in Missouri.197 In 2010, there were
115,038 small business employers.198 A lower standard of causation in
workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases, such as the one
promulgated in Templemire, will make it easier for employees to sue their
employers. As a result, employees may bring frivolous lawsuits against their
employers in the hopes of getting a settlement. Those businesses have no
choice but to spend money to defend the lawsuits. The legal costs will have a
detrimental effect on small business owners whose financial resources are
limited. Small businesses may in turn be wiped out by the additional costs.
The easier it is for employees to sue their employer, the bigger the
disincentive for small businesses to do business in Missouri. All Missourians
must be protected; not only employees who are discriminated against, but
business owners as well. Aligning Missouri workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge cases more closely with federal discrimination laws would protect
both employees and employers.
F.

The lower standard has far-reaching implications for Missouri employers
1.

Expansion of Employer Liability

The Templemire holding will greatly expand employer liability by
lowering the standard of causation necessary for discharged employees to
prevail against an employer for retaliatory discharge claims.199 The
contributing factor standard of causation promulgated in Templemire means
employees can prevail in an action against their employers, even if there was a
legitimate reason for the disciplinary action or discharge. Employees may, as a
result, attempt to shield themselves from disciplinary action by filing petty
workers’ compensation claims. For example,

196. Wes Duplantier, Controversial Workplace Discrimination Law Passes Missouri House,
AOL JOBS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2012/02/10/controversial-workplace-dis
crimination-law-passes-missouri-house/ [http://perma.cc/C9RE-QX8A].
197. Small Business Profile: Missouri, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADVOC. (Feb.
2013), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/mo12.pdf [http://perma.cc/65LR-HRAB].
198. Id.
199. Maniscalco, supra note 1, at 1, 14.
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[A]n employee who admittedly was fired for tardiness, absenteeism, or
incompetence at work would still be able to maintain a cause of action for
discharge if the worker could persuade a factfinder that, in addition to the other
causes, a cause of discharge was the exercise of rights under the workers’
compensation law. Such rule would encourage marginally competent
employees to file the most petty claims in order to enjoy the benefits of
200
heightened job security.

Any employee who is discharged and has filed a workers’ compensation claim,
whether petty or not, is a possible plaintiff and a lower standard of causation
will increase their odds of success.201 Accordingly, employers may hesitate to
discharge employees who have filed workers’ compensation claims, causing
unproductive employees to remain in the workforce, essentially creating unfair
job security.
2.

Increased Frequency of Claims

A lower standard of causation makes it easier for employees to file claims
and recover pursuant to section 287.780. The lower standard for liability means
employers are more likely to violate the retaliation provision. Increased
employer liability will signal to all employees who have exercised their
workers’ compensation rights that they might be able to win a retaliation claim,
even if they do not think it had anything to do with their discharge. As a result,
the number and frequency of frivolous claims will likely increase,
overcrowding courts. Increased frequency of potentially meritless claims may
cause employers to forego hiring additional employees in order to avoid the
added costs of petty claims. To that end, employers may choose to relocate in
states with a higher standard for retaliatory discharge claims, hurting the
Missouri economy.
The Supreme Court of the United States expressed similar concerns when
considering the proper standard of causation in Title VII retaliation claims.
Title VII’s retaliation provision makes it unlawful
[F]or an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
202
subchapter.

200. Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Mo. 1998), overruled by Templemire v. W & M
Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014).
201. James B. Kennedy, Missouri Supreme Court Overrules 3 Decades of Retaliatory
Discharge Law, EVANS & DIXON, LLC (2014), http://www.evans-dixon.com/article/2616/
Missouri-Supreme-Court-Overrules-3-Decades-ofRetaliatory-Discharge-Law.aspx [http://perma.
cc/MWJ6-VGP2].
202. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (West 2006).
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In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Supreme
Court expressed concern regarding the potential uptick in Title VII retaliation
claims as a result of a lower standard of causation.203 The Court noted that
Title VII retaliation claims were already being made with “ever-increasing
frequency.”204 As of 2013, the number of Title VII retaliation claims filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “ha[d] nearly
doubled in the past fifteen years.”205 The Court reasoned that “lessening the
causation standard could . . . contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, which
would siphon resources from efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and
courts to combat [discrimination].”206 Accordingly, the Court interpreted the
language in the Title VII retaliation statute as requiring a heightened standard
of causation.207
In addition to expanding employer liability and increasing the frequency of
workers’ compensation retaliatory discharges claims, a lower standard of
causation has practical effects as well.
3.

Procedural and Practical Changes for Courts and Employers

a.

The Templemire decision should be given prospective-only effect

The new standard of causation established in Templemire creates a
logistical issue—when should the new standard take effect? The Missouri
Court of Appeals, Eastern District, in Kueffer v. Brown, established a three-part
test to be applied when determining whether overruling decisions should be
applied retroactively to previous cases or prospectively to future cases.208 A
Missouri Supreme Court decision overruling a previous substantive law should
be given prospective-only effect:
(1) if the decision establishes a new principle of law by overruling clear past
precedent; (2) if the purpose and effect of the newly announced rule will be
retarded by retroactive application; and (3) if, after balancing the interests of
those who may be affected by the change in law and weighing the degree to
which parties may have relied upon the old rule and the hardship the parties
might suffer from retroactive application of the new rule against the possible
hardship to the parties who would be denied the benefit of the new rule,
209
retrospective application would be unfair.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2533.
Kueffer v. Brown, 879 S.W.2d 658, 663–64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.
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Application of the Kueffer v. Brown three-part test indicates the Templemire
holding should be applied prospectively to workers’ compensation retaliation
cases. The first prong is met because Templemire overruled thirty years of
precedent established by Hansome and Crabtree. These seminal cases
established the exclusive cause standard of causation. The Missouri Supreme
Court explained that “the reasoning in Hansome, and the cases it relied on, is
flawed. Therefore, . . . [Hansome and Crabtree] no longer should be
followed.”210 The court failed to follow precedent and instead elected to adopt
a lower standard of causation.
The second prong is also met. Application of this rule retroactively would
“allow a litigant who failed to respond to his opponent’s summary judgment
motion to appeal the prior ruling and re-open a case that has already been
appropriately dismissed by the trial court.”211 Although not stated in the
Templemire opinion, one can “assume that it was not the Supreme Court’s
purpose and intended effect in Templemire.”212 Fundamental fairness dictates
that employers should not have to litigate a matter again.213
The third prong, which balances the interests of those affected by the
change in law, favors prospective-only application of the new contributing
factor standard. Employees and employers “operate[] under and [rely] on the
application of the law as it currently stands, not as the law may one day be.”214
The standard for workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims was well
settled for thirty years, indicating a longstanding reliance by employers on the
old exclusive cause standard.
Having met the Kueffer v. Brown three-part test, the Templemire holding
should be applied prospectively to workers’ compensation retaliation cases.
b.

Action Required

Employers should be aware of the implications of the Templemire decision
before taking disciplinary action against employees who have exercised their
workers’ compensation rights. Although Missouri is an at-will state, it is no
longer enough for an employer to have a legitimate motive behind discharging
an employee. Now, employees only need to show that filing a workers’
compensation claim was a contributing factor in the employer’s decision to
discharge the employee.215 Employers should take the following precautions to
protect themselves from such inquiries: (1) “strive to make the reasons for

210. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 382 (Mo. 2014).
211. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 9, Deml v. Sheehan Pipeline Constr. Co., No.
ED101461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014), 2014 WL 4783299, at *9.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 10.
214. Id. at 9.
215. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
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disciplinary actions transparent and fair,”216 (2) “take all disciplinary actions
knowing that the action may be reviewed or second guessed in a subsequent
proceeding should the employee claim retaliation,”217 and (3) seek legal
counsel when discharging an employee who has filed a workers’ compensation
claim.218
CONCLUSION
The Missouri Supreme Court erred in overturning the exclusive cause
standard of causation for a section 287.780 cause of action. The Templemire
decision lowered the standard of causation in workers’ compensation
retaliatory discharge claims from “exclusive cause” to “contributing factor.”
As a result, employees only have to show that filing a workers’ compensation
claim was a contributing factor in their termination. In doing so, the court
failed to align workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims with other
Missouri employment discrimination laws as it intended. Furthermore, the
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision overturned thirty years of well-established
precedent that had been ratified by the Missouri Legislature. Additionally,
similar statutory schemes in other states support, at the very least, a
“significant factor” standard of causation. Finally, Templemire has farreaching, adverse implications for employers. The Missouri Supreme Court
expanded potential liability for Missouri employers, and, as a result, the
number of frivolous claims will likely increase. Employers will be forced to
decide whether firing someone is worth the potential expense of a workers’
compensation retaliatory discharge claim, thus creating unfair job security.
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